ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Bargaining activities occur in a wide variety of political, economic, and social settings. Recently, with the rapid advancement of e-commerce, people find themselves increasingly involved in cross-cultural dealings; the pertinence of cultural differences in negotiations is becoming noticeable (Tse et al., 1994; Brett and Okumura, 1998; Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999; Tinsley et al., 1999) , and carries important implications for research. At the same time, the form of negotiation support is evolving, and is influenced by fields such as distributed artificial intelligence. The growing interest in autonomous interacting software agents and their potential application in e-commerce opens up exciting possibilities for "automated" bargaining. The potentials of agents in online bargaining have been recognized in single-issue as well as multipleissue negotiations (Terry et al., 2000; Yan et al., 2000) . The early work consists mainly of conceptual models or exploration of technical feasibilities. A "drawback" of automated agents lies in the fact that oftentimes recommendations or actions are unexplained to the user. This paper explores the incorporation of explanation facility, a feature of knowledge-based systems (KBSs), into automated agents. The lack of research efforts on both culture and explanation facility in the context of negotiation provides the primary impetus for the current study. The study contributes toward research and practice by identifying and examining a novel combination of two important aspects, power distance (an important cultural dimension) and explanation facility. It serves to highlight to practitioners the crucial conditions that would elicit effectiveness of the negotiation support technology.
Prior research has generally revealed culture's influence in IS research (e.g., Tan et al., 1993; Watson et al., 1994) . At the same time, work in KBSs has shown the usefulness of explanations (e.g., Gregor, 1996) . However, as pointed out earlier, efforts are wanting in jointly visiting and examining culture and explanation facility.
The current research focuses on impact evaluation involving software agents. One independent variable in this research is explanation facility, a unique characteristic of KBSs. We attempt to incorporate explanation facility into the software agent and examine its influence. Mindful of the role of culture in bargaining and other business activities, and how it may moderate the impact of explanation facility, power distance-an important dimension of cultureis examined as the other independent variable. Specifically, the current study addresses the following research questions: (1) What are the effects due to availability of explanation facility on negotiation outcomes? (2) How does power distance moderate the above relationships? These questions address new and important aspects of negotiation support, and have implications on both the design and use of negotiation technologies. This paper is organized as follows.
The next section provides an overview of the theoretical background. Subsequently, the research model and hypotheses are presented. The research method is deliberated, followed by the results section. A discussion of the findings is then provided.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND Negotiation Agents and E-Commerce
A main hindrance of effective bargaining can be attributed to the cognitive limitations of the human information processing capability as well as process losses associated with communication. At the individual level, a consequence of being capacity-limited is to "satisfice" (Simon, 1957) and employ cognitive heuristics that would produce decisions efficiently (Kahneman et al., 1982) though most often imperfectly (Kerr et al., 1996) . At the group level (negotiation involves more than one person), process losses happen such as "concentration blocking," which refers to the phenomenon that fewer comments are made because group members concentrate on remembering rather than thinking of new ones, until they can contribute them, as a result of short-term memory limitations (Nunamaker et al., 1991- includes an elaborate discussion on gains and losses associated with group processes).
The limitations as mentioned lead to the concept of negotiation support systems (NSSs), which are interactive, computerbased tools intended to assist negotiating parties in reaching an agreement. In some sense, NSSs can be considered a subset of group support systems (GSSs), which can be used to support virtual teams (Huang, Wei, and Lim, 2003) . NSSs offer the potential for enhancing the problem-solving process and for helping to alleviate the cognitive and socio-emotional stumbling blocks to successful negotiations (Anson and Jelassi, 1990; Foroughi and Jelassi, 1990; Jelassi and Foroughi, 1989) . Research on NSSs has primarily focused on two key technological aspects: (1) group decision and/or conflict resolution models to help negotiators reduce discord and increase the chance of reaching consensus, and (2) providing rich communication media to enhance communication exchange between antagonists (Bui and Shakun, 1997) .
While traditional Web-based NSSs are quite powerful tools, they require nearconstant human input. The advance of ecommerce has highlighted the need for automated negotiation support, a process that involves one or more bargaining agents. These agents employ artificial intelligence techniques such as machine learning, casebased reasoning, rule-based formalism, neural networks, and predicate calculus. In addition, the implementations and the computational approaches employed by some NSSs are relevant to and suggestive of possibilities for electronic bargaining agents. One example of the use of computational techniques is a concession model of Matwin et al. (1991) , which presents a general strategy of concession in multi-issue negotiation.
Identifying efficient solutions involves substantial information-processing activities-estimating of preferences, generating of alternatives, evaluating of alternatives, and so on. It cannot be realized without considerable information-processing capacity. However, negotiators often do not know each other's utility function. Even if a good guess is somehow made available, it is virtually implausible to process the myriad possibilities of solutions; a sub-optimal settlement is often the result. Negotiation agents, by negotiating with each other automatically with minimum user supervision, remove those human factors to a great extent. Notwithstanding the above, it is viable to treat negotiation as a multi-tiered phenomenon. At the top level are fullscaled negotiations such as union-management contract bargaining; the middle level consists of "defined type" bargaining involving a limited number of issues; at the bottom level are mini-negotiations regarding very specific issues. It is fair to suggest that negotiation support tools generally focus on the lower two levels; but more general communications tools could simply keep track of all issues, and calculate costs and benefits of potential arrangements and tradeoffs, as a support rather than substitute for the human negotiator.
Compared to the traditional NSSs, negotiation agents perhaps remove to a larger degree the cognitive heuristics of humans, as the agents are not quite bounded in their computational/information-processing ability. Hence, there are possibilities for them to make fully rational decisions. However, the complex nature of negotiation activity puts a high demand for extensive instructions to be fed to negotiation agents. The negotiation strategies specified, together with their modifications, form the centerpiece of an electronic negotiation agent. Their appropriateness has a great impact on the agent's subsequent performance vis-à-vis bargaining outcomes. Negotiation agents can offer a number of potential benefits. First, a system of autonomous agentbased negotiations could increase the efficiency of settlements even for semi-structured, multi-issue business bargaining problems, in which negotiators hold private preference functions and possess incentives to misrepresent their own preferences (Oliver, 1997) . Second, agents decrease the opportunity costs of transactions. For automated agents, the modest computational costs associated with today's high-speed computers are only a fraction of traditional transaction costs. Third, people may utilize autonomous negotiation agents to accomplish the task in their stead, and avoid the hassle of bargaining with others face-toface. It should be pointed out that substituting agents for humans does not make the decisions rational-it simply narrows the field of discussion. Given a variety of issues, it could in principle define a pareto threshold where all decision combinations are technically equivalent and let bargaining between humans occur along this threshold.
Some examples of agents are briefly discussed in the following. The MAGMA project, which provided market architecture for multi-agent contracting, was limited to simple offers that negotiated over price alone in a limited form of the Vickrey auction and did not support multi-attribute negotiation (Tsvetovatyy et al., 1997) . Kasbah system was an object-oriented distributed artificial intelligent multi-agent system, using offers which competing buyer and seller agents created, rejected, and accepted; however, the attribute for negotiation was again price alone (Chavez and Maes, 1996) . The Virtual Property Agency was developed to support users with information collection and channel to communicate with their counterparts (Yen et al., 2000) .
Explanation Facility
Either the provider or the receiver of information may initiate explanations (Gregor and Benbasat, 1999) . Provider of information may initiate (i.e., provide) explanations for purposes of clarifying, justifying, or convincing; an explanation used in this sense may be viewed in terms of rhetoric or argumentation (Toulmin et al., 1984) . At the same time, receiver of information can initiate (i.e., request) explanations to resolve misunderstanding or disagreement (Gilbert, 1989; Ortony and Partridge, 1987; Schank, 1986) . In this paper, we are more interested in the provision of explanations. Three main types of explanations have been identified (Chandrasekaran et al. 1988; Clancey, 1983 Clancey, , 1993 Southwick, 1991) . Reasoning trace refers to a record of the inferential steps taken by the system to reach a conclusion. Justification is an explicit description of the causal argument or rationale behind each inferential step taken by the system. Strategy is a high-level goal structure that determines how the system uses its domain knowledge to accomplish a task.
Providing explanations for recommended actions is deemed one of the most important capabilities of expert systems or knowledge-based systems. Explanation facilities are used primarily because they can assist users with the understanding of unfamiliar terms and requests during data input, thus leading to greater accuracy of input. Use of explanations improves the performance achieved with KBSs as an aid (Gregor and Benbasat, 1999) . Use of feedback explanations increases the accuracy of decision making (Dhaliwal, 1993; Dhaliwal and Benbasat, 1996) . Hayes-Roth and Jacobstein (1994) noted that explanations, by virtue of making the performance of a system transparent to its users, are influential for user acceptance of intelligent systems and for improving users' trust in the advice provided. A more detailed literature review can be found in Gregor and Benbasat (1999) .
Nevertheless, much of the previous research on explanation facility has been done in the expert systems or KBS field. This paper argues for the extension or transfer of this idea to software agents in the e-commerce context. It is clear that agents are now being actively deployed in e-commerce, for example, to search on the Web for the trader selling a given product at the cheapest price (Jango: http:// www.jango.com; PersonaLogic: http:// www.personaLogic.com; Firefly: http:// www.firefly.com; AuctionBot: http:// auction.eecs.umich.edu). However, marriage of explanation facilities to software agents is not yet commonplace. Most agents just get specifications from users and accomplish the tasks on behalf of their owners-without ever providing owners with explanations of their actions.
Power Distance
Culture is the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another (Hofstede, 1991) . Hofstede identified four dimensions of culture: power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity, which have formed the foundation of much cultural research. Other dimensions proposed include communications context (Hall, 1976) , monochrony (Hall and Hall, 1990) , and time perspective (Hofstede and Bond, 1988 ). An example of recent empirical work involves a qualitative study to examine the linkage between information technology transfer and cultural factors that support or impede a successful transfer (Hill, Straub, and El-Sheshai, 1998) . Other recent studies on culture include Rose and Straub (1998) and Straub et al. (2001 Straub et al. ( , 2002 .
This study focuses on power distance, which indicates the extent to which a society accepts the fact that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally (Hofstede, 1980) . 1 The choice of this dimension is dominated by the relevancy of context: it is conceivable that people's attitude toward power distribution in society would be highly relevant to the bargaining context. Other dimensions are outside the scope of this work and remain for future investigations. Figure 1 depicts the research model. Three dependent variables are of interest: performance, trust in agent, and satisfaction with outcome. Performance is indicated by the user's total utility scores pertinent to the agreement reached. The model also looks at the degree of trust the user has placed in the software agent, as well as the satisfaction level of the user related to the outcome.
HYPOTHESES
Power distance is positioned as a moderating variable: it moderates the relationship between availability of explanation facility and the outcome variables. 
Effect on Performance

Effect of availability of explanation facility
Use of explanations improves the performance achieved with a KBS as an aid (Gregor and Benbasat, 1999 ). Dhaliwal's (1993) study showed that the use of feedback (reasoning trace) explanations improved the accuracy of decision making. Gregor (1996) found that use of explanations of all types was related to improved problem-solving performance. De Greef and Neerincx (1995) reported that an "aiding" interface improved performance with a statistical program. Although these studies were done mainly on KBS, it is reasonable to anticipate benefits from explanations in the context of negotiation support. There are mainly two functions of explanation facility in negotiation agents: one is to describe what agents have done and why agents behave that way; the other is to provide users with the problem-solving knowledge. Explanations not only increase the comprehensibility of the analyses given by the negotiation agent, but also exert informational power over the negotiators (Kaplan and Miller, 1987) , thus improving performance.
H1: Negotiation performance levels will be higher for those using explanation facilities in contrast to those not using them.
Moderating effect of power distance
The positive effect of explanation facility is culturally bound; power distance should have a marked bearing on the use of explanation support. In a culture with large power distance, subordinates defer to superiors and do not question their authority. People with this kind of mentality are more likely to pay attention to explanations (offered by the negotiation system) which they view to be a source of authority. On the contrary, people coming from low power-distance background may care less about explanations, as they tend to make decisions based on their own knowledge and experience.
2 We thus predict an interactive effect, that the influence of explanation facility on negotiation outcomes is smaller with lower power distance than with higher power distance.
H2: The effect of explanation support
on performance will be moderated by power distance, such that it is more positive for users from large power distance culture than those from small power distance culture.
Effect on trust
Effect of availability of explanation facility Trust can be defined as the willingness to risk increasing "one's vulnerability to another whose behavior is not under one's control" (Zand, 1972, p. 230) . The first rule of successful negotiation, according to Bazerman and Neale (1992) , is to build trust. In a traditional buyer-seller negotiation, trust is referenced toward the opposite party. However, with the introduction of negotiation support, which acts as a form of mediation for two parties, trust is referenced toward the system. It is important to note this subtlety.
It is widely agreed that the trust is the key success factor of e-commerce (Keen, 1999) . An increase in trust decreases transaction costs of relationships because individuals have to engage less in self-protective actions in preparation for the possibility of others' opportunistic behavior (Kramer and Tyler, 1996) . Research has revealed a close relationship between trust and control mechanisms (Holland and Lockett, 1998; Luhmann, 1979) . If people have full control over the transaction, they are more likely to have trust. It is evident that a lower level of sense of control is associated with the use of negotiation agents when explanations are not provided.
H3: Trust in agent will be greater for
those using explanation facilities in contrast to those not using them.
Moderating effect of power distance
To the extent that performance is moderated by culture (see earlier section), trust is similarly affected.
H4: The effect of explanation support
on trust in agent will be moderated by power distance, such that it is more positive for users from large power distance culture than those from small power distance culture.
Effect on satisfaction
Effect of availability of explanation facility
We predict a generally elevated degree of satisfaction with outcome owing to the provision of explanations. Greater satisfaction is anticipated, mainly as a result of better understanding of the otherwise hidden process the software agents have undergone, the improved negotiation performance, and the increased trust in the software agents.
H5: Satisfaction with outcome will be
greater for those using explanation facilities in contrast to those not using them.
Moderating effect of power distance
To the extent that performance is moderated by culture (see earlier section), satisfaction is similarly affected.
H6: The effect of explanation support
on satisfaction with outcome will be moderated by power distance, such that it is more positive for users from large-power distance culture than those from small power-distance culture.
RESEARCH METHOD Research Design
A laboratory experiment with 2x2 factorial design was conducted. The independent variables were power distance (high vs. low) and explanation facility (present vs. absent). Eighty-two undergraduates from a large university served as subjects for this experiment. Two groups of students for investigating the power distance effects were used, consisting of Singaporeans and Mauritians. A marked difference in power distance was shown between the two peoples in Hofstede's (1980) 
Task
Adapted from Jones (1988) , the task involved negotiation over four issues of a purchase agreement for turbochargers, an engine subcomponent. The issues are unit price, purchase quantity, warranty period, and date of first delivery. The subject assumed the role of buyer, while computer simulated sellers. In this experiment, two software agents were used to aid negotiation. One is search agent, which gets requirements from its owner, then looks for potential sellers on the Internet. The other is negotiation agent, which uses genetic algorithm (GA) in carrying out negotiation process.
Genetic algorithms are search techniques inspired by the natural evolutionary processes of variation and selection. GAs can be viewed abstractly from many aspects: process description, searching, learning, and evolution. The most concrete view is to analyze the actual process of genetic operations. The operations perform an efficient search, which has an implicit parallelism, as different members of the population can operate independently. New offspring are continuously created and they search new areas. For details on GA, refer to Goldberg (1989) .
Experimental Procedure
Upon arrival, the subject was given general instructions that outlined the procedures and the aim of the experiment. He/ she then proceeded to read the case and gain background information about the company he/she was supposedly representing. The subject's preferences and utility function were elicited; the utility scores reflect the degree of importance one places on the ranges of values for each issue (Keeney and Raiffa, 1991) . Since in this study power distance is one independent variable, a culture inclination questionnaire adapted from (Hofstede, 1991) was administered before the negotiation process. The subject also answered a demographics questionnaire. Next was training on how to use the system, after which the subject was given ten minutes to familiarize with the system, and given a chance to clarify doubts with the experimenter. The subject then proceeded to negotiate; with the use of the system, there were three specific activities he/she had to carry out: initialize negotiation agent, start search process, and decide on seller. For each condition, a log file was used to capture operations. After the negotiation, the subject completed a set of questionnaires on satisfaction and trust. See appendices for the various questionnaires.
Computation of Utility Scores for Measuring Performance
For each of the negotiation variables (unit price, purchase quantity, warranty period, and date of first delivery), several conditions (or values) exist. For the moment, suppose the negotiation only involves "unit price" and "warranty period," and that each has three values; thus, "unit price" assumes the values "high," "medium," and "low"; and "warranty period" assumes the values "short," "medium," and "long." If the buyer accords higher priority to "unit price" than "warranty period," there should be a way for this preference to be expressed. The approach is to give a higher weightage (e.g., 60) to "unit price" while a lower one (e.g., 40) to "warranty period"; the total weightage is 100. As well, one should be allowed to distinguish between the different values within a variable. For example, if the lowest unit price is hoped for, then this value of unit price will have a weightage of 60 (maximum); a higher unit price, say "medium," may have a weightage of 50, while "high" unit price may have a weightage of only 35. Similar specifications can be made of "warranty period," in which case "long" warranty period will be given a weightage of 40 (maximum).
Elicitation of one's utility functions involving all four issues (unit price, purchase quantity, warranty period, and date of first delivery) allows the carrying out of several types of analysis, such as deriving the total utility obtainable for a certain combination of variable values. The sum of utilities of the agreed values, then, represents the total utility score attained, or negotiation performance. See Lim (1999) for a detailed discussion on utility specification.
RESULTS
Control checks were performed on gender, working experience, experience in making business decisions, experience in using computer, and experience in using NSS. Results showed no difference across conditions.
A t-test was conducted on the powerdistance scores between the "high" condition (Singaporeans) (mean=73.54, s.d.= 65.63) and the "low" condition (Mauritians) (mean=40.42, s.d.=55.35), and confirmed significant differences in the desired direction (t=2.42, p<0.02). This served as a manipulation check for the culture factor. 
Performance
Performance was measured as the sum of utility scores obtained for a given settlement (i.e., points a negotiator earned), and ranged between 1 and 100; more points indicate better outcome.
The ANOVA table is shown in Table  1 . A significant interaction effect is seen (F=15.36, p=0 .00).
The interaction effect was further explored by studying the effect of explanation while holding the other independent variable constant (see Figure 3) . In high power-distance situation, explanation served to boost performance significantly (t=5.48, p=0.00); the effect of explanation was not observed in low power-distance situation (t=0.72, p=0.48).
Hypothesis H1 was not supported; H2 was supported. Table 2 shows the ANOVA results. A significant main effect due to explanation is observed (F=24.73, p=0.00). Subjects provided with explanation facility perceived greater trust (mean=3.96, s.d.=0.44) than those not provided (mean=3. 44, s.d.=0.57) . The questionnaire adopted a scale of 1 to 5.
Trust in Agent
Given the importance of the trust variable within the e-commerce context (McKnight et al., 2002) , a content analysis was also performed to supplement the perceptual measure. Questions were placed on the system's screens at strategic points throughout the process; users' responses (in words) were coded into a scale of 1 to 5 by two independent coders. Cohen's Kappa (which corrects for chance agreement) was calculated to assess inter-rater reliability, and turned out as 0.68. Consistent with the perceptual measure, content analysis of trust showed a significant main effect owing to explanation (F=12.27, p=0.00). This supplementary analysis serves to strengthen the finding on the role of explanation vis-à-vis trust. Hypothesis H3 was supported; H4 was not supported.
Satisfaction
The ANOVA results are shown in Table 3 . Explanation exhibited a significant main effect on satisfaction (F=47.42, p=0.00). Subjects provided with explanation facility reported higher satisfaction with outcome (mean=3.64, s.d.=0.56) than those not provided (mean=3. 15, s.d.=0.67) . The questionnaire adopted a scale of 1 to 5.
Hypothesis H5 was supported; H6 was not supported. 
DISCUSSION
It is to be recognized at the outset that all users were supported with software agents, which conducted search and negotiation. In other words, this study is not about the effect of software agents per se, since the situation of not having agents has been earlier argued as inferior. Rather, this paper posited and found that users derived benefits from software agents to various extents. Particularly, people from high power-distance culture were more influenced by the explanation incorporated into the system and obtained higher performance. In contrast, low power-distance people, who plausibly deemed explanation less important, consequently reported lower performance. This manifestation of interaction between power distance and technological feature has practical implications. A direct implication would be the need to tailor the expectations that practitioners should have of potential benefits of technology, owing to the role of power distance. Its ramification in a globalized workplace and mixed-cultural workgroups must be appreciated.
Notwithstanding the interaction led on by power distance, we would still recommend the incorporation of explanation facility into software agents. The bettered performance in terms of negotiation settlement could be attributed to the user's (or negotiator's) acceptance of explanations given by the system. Heeding the explanations, the user was able to choose in a wise manner from the group of sellers presented by the search agent. This thinking is in line with previous findings. For example, Dhaliwal (1993) found that the use of feedback (reasoning trace) explanations had a positive effect on the accuracy of decision making. Mao (1995) found that increased use of deep explanations led novice subjects to make judgments that were similar to those of experts who contributed their knowledge to the development of the KBS.
Positive results on users' attitude are encouraging. In particular, the increased trust toward agent boosted by the explanation facility is certainly of practical significance. The importance of trust and how it may impact performance cannot be overemphasized (Zand, 1972) . Given the e-commerce context, mechanisms that help increase trust in software agents are certainly welcome. User satisfaction was also found to be elevated by the provision of explanations. This finding is especially pertinent when viewed together with the corresponding effect on trust. Clearly, it is advantageous for system developers to provide due consideration to incorporating explanations into software agents.
Overall, the explanation facility has proven useful for the dependent variables of concern, i.e., performance, trust, and satisfaction, although its impact on performance needs to be qualified by power distance, an important dimension of culture. Whereas this study has examined two independent variables, the provision (or avail- ability) of explanation facility is a fundamentally different type of independent variable from power distance, in that the former is artificial (man-made) and the latter natural (or a matter of predisposition). Because of this very nature, explanation facility should be exploited to the fullest for negotiation support. This study has the following limitations. First, a specific tool was used; it is conceivable that other tools might produce other results. Second, it has tested only the buyer and not the seller. These have implications for future research, to be discussed next.
Future research should look into a closely related issue that is interface design, to see how best to present explanations, so that maximal benefits may be derived from this facility. Likewise, the moderating role of power distance should be greater explored in future extensions; such efforts should also examine those cultural dimensions not addressed in the current study. Along this line, more cultures can be studied. It should also be of interest to reverse experimental subjects' role from buyer to seller and study the possible differences in outcome measures. Further expansion can be made both in terms of the examination of explanation facilities and the use of other kinds of tools.
CONCLUSION
This study was conducted to address two questions: (1) What are the effects due to availability of explanation facility on negotiation outcomes? (2) How does power distance moderate the above relationships? Our findings have shown an almost penetrating effect of explanation facility, that its availability raised performance under certain circumstances, trust in agent, and satisfaction with outcome. Power distance, in fact, was the moderator on the relationship between the availability of explanation facility and performance, such that the benefits of explanations were visible in high power-distance context, but non-existent in low power-distance context.
APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS FOR TRUST AND SATISFACTION
(1) Trust 1. If I had it my way, I would not let the agent have any influence over issues that are important to my deal. 2. I would not be comfortable in giving the agent complete responsibility for completion of the task. 3. I really wish I had a good way to oversee the work of the agent on the task. 4. I would not be comfortable giving the software agent a task or problem that was critical to the task, even if I could monitor the agent. The following explanations were given for the four different types of managers:
Manager A: Usually makes his/her decisions promptly and communicates them to his/her subordinates clearly and firmly. Expects them to carry out the decisions loyally and without raising difficulties.
Manager B: Usually makes his/her decisions promptly, but before going ahead, tries to explain them fully to his/her subordinates. Gives them the reasons for the decisions and answers whatever questions they may have.
Manager C: Usually consults with his/ her subordinates before he/she reaches his/ her decisions. Listens to their advice, considers it, and then announces his/her decision. He/she then expects all to work loyally to implement it whether or not it is in accordance with the advice they gave.
Manager D: Usually calls a meeting of his/her subordinates when there is an important decision to be made. Puts the problem before the group and tries to obtain consensus. If he/she obtains consensus, he/she accepts this as the decision. If consensus is impossible, he/she usually makes the decision him/herself.
